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Divisibility of Injury Under CERCLA: 
Reaching for the Unreachable Goal 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Intending to solve the United States' hazardous substance cleanup 
problem, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).1 Not-
withstanding the comprehensive coverage of its hazardous substance 
cleanup provisions, CERCLA's standards of liability are vague. How-
ever, courts have uniformly interpreted CERCLA's liability as strict, 
with joint and several liability being imposed, unless the defendant can 
prove divisibility of injury.2 Apportionment of harm in CERCLA cases 
is a two stage process: (1) a defendant can prove divisibility of the in-
jury, and be held liable only for the amount caused, but if he is unable 
to do this, then (2) apportionment will occur in actions for contribution. 
However, as a practical matter, it is not possible for a CERCLA de-
fendant to prove divisibility of injury because of the difficulty in estab-
lishing which portion of the harm he caused. 
This comment discusses CERCLA's background, the scope of 
CERCLA liability, and three proffered methods of providing for divisi-
bility of injury in CERCLA cases: the Gore amendments of H.R. 
7020, the common law embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
and the economic efficiency method recently proposed by Professors 
Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Revesz of New York University School 
of Law. 3 This comment concludes that: (1) the Gore amendments were 
appropriately deleted from CERCLA as they added nothing to the 
common law approach, (2) the Second Restatement is inefficient and as 
a practical matter does not allow for divisibility of injury, and (3) 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz were correct in concluding that inju-
ries from joint polluters are not divisible. However, this comment dis-
agrees with Professors Kornhauser and Revesz's proposed "efficient" 
method of apportionment in CERCLA cases. Moreover, this comment 
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(1988)). 
2. See infra parts II, III.B.3. 
3. Kornhauser & Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 
(1989). Professors Kornhauser and Revesz's article has application outside of CERCLA, but 
CERCLA is the central theme for their work and is used as the basis for most of their examples. 
See id. at 835. 
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recommends that because of the practical impossibility of proving divis-
ibility of injury, apportionment of harm should come in contribution 
actions in accordance with the proportion of the harm caused by each 
defendant. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1 97 6, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA)4 to deal with this country's solid waste problems.11 
Although RCRA deals with all solid waste disposal,6 "Congress' 'over-
riding concern' ... was to establish the framework for a national sys-
tem to insure the safe management of hazardous waste. " 7 Hazardous 
waste management under RCRA is a "cradle-to-grave" approach 
which "regulates the generation, transportation and ultimate disposal of 
hazardous waste."8 Although RCRA regulates hazardous waste from 
generation through disposal, it does not provide for cleanup of inactive 
and abandoned hazardous waste sites. 9 
In 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that 
"between 1,200-2,000 [of the estimated 30,000 to 50,000 inactive sites] 
4. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K 
(1988)). 
5. Congress, in the Congressional findings section of RCRA, stated that the economic and 
population growth of the United States, including improvements in the standard of living, techno-
logical advances, and improvements in methods of manufacture, packaging, and marketing of con-
sumer products erected a serious problem for disposal of solid wastes, especially for metropolitan 
and urban areas. See id. at § 6901(a)(l)-(3). Congress believed that, though the states should 
continue to control the collection and disposal of solid wastes, "Federal action [was required] 
through financial and technical assistance and leadership in the development, demonstration, and 
application of new and improved methods and processes to reduce the amount of work and un-
salvageable materials and to provide for proper and economical solid waste disposal practices." /d. 
at § 6901(a)(4). 
6. Under RCRA, the key to determining if waste falls under RCRA regulation is if it is 
"discarded material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6903 (27) (1988) (emphasis added). 
7. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing H.R. 
REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. Nt:ws 
6238, 6240-41 ). 
8. Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 12 ENVTL. L. 679, 687 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
9. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1016]. "Since enactment of 
[RCRA] a major new source of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences of 
improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices known as the inactive 
hazardous waste site problem." /d. In an inactive disposal site, "the disposer or other responsible 
party has ceased disposal activities but retained ownership or occupation of the property." Note, 
Inactive or Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Coping with a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 1709, 1710 (1980). "Abandoned disposal sites are also inactive, however, they are the 
sites in which the disposer or other responsible party is no longer identifiable." /d. 
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present[ed] a serious risk to public health."10 In an effort to remedy this 
problem, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).n CER-
CLA regulates hazardous substances, as opposed to the discarded haz-
ardous wastes regulated under RCRA. An exhaustive list of hazardous 
substances promulgated by the EPA, pursuant to section 9602 of CER-
CLA, 12 and a wide array of other substances are defined as hazardous 
substances under CERCLA. These include: any RCRA hazardous 
waste; any substance listed or designated pursuant to sections 
1321(b)(2)(A) and 1371(a), respectively, of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA)/3 any hazardous air pollutant listed under 
section 112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA);14 and any immediately haz-
ardous chemical substance or mixture which the EPA has taken action 
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15-Commerce and Trade. 16 
Liability under CERCLA, or the "Superfund Act,"16 can be im-
posed on responsible parties, i.e., those who are (1) current owners and 
operators, (2) past owners and operators, (3) disposers, and (4) trans-
portersP The EPA can enforce this liability under section 9606 or sec-
10. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 9, at 18. By 1984, the EPA had "identified 19,187 
potentially hazardous sites and estimated that the number could reach 22,000." IS [Current De-
velopments] Env't Rep. (BNA) IS31 Uan. 2S, 198S). The EPA had also "completed 'preliminary 
assessments' of 11,662 sites identified as potentially dangerous and ha[d] investigated 4,36S for 
possible inclusion on the National Priorities List." /d. 
II. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-967S (1988). 
12. See EPA Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1990). 
13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(2)(A), 1371(a) (1988). 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988). 
IS. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). 
16. The name "Superfund" originally came from section 9631 which provided for a hazard-
ous substance response trust fund. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (repealed Oct. 17, 1986). 
17. Under section 9607(a), a responsible party may be required to pay the costs of: (I) re-
moval and remedial action, (2) contribution costs, (3) damages to natural resources, and ( 4) health 
studies made pursuant to section 9604(i) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Responsible 
parties under section 9607(a) are defined as: 
/d. 
(I) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
cooperated any facility at which such hazardous substance owned or operated any facil-
ity at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of 
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, 
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and 
containing such hazardous substances, and 
( 4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of 
response costs, of a hazardous substance . . . . 
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tion 9607 of CERCLA. Section 9606 liability is imposed when the 
"President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment be-
cause of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from 
a facility."18 Section 9607, "Superfund Liability," is imposed when the 
site is placed on the National Priorities List requiring remedial ac-
tion, 19 or when a responsible party undertakes a cleanup program and 
sues another responsible party for response costs.20 Potentially responsi-
ble parties do have some limited defenses to this liability.21 
III. THE SCOPE OF CERCLA LIABILITY 
A. Strict Liability 
Prior to CERCLA's passage, Congress removed all references to 
strict liability.22 As a result, the only guidance for the standard of lia-
bility comes from the definition of liability in section 9601 (32): "the 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a); see also Clark, Section 106 of CERCLA: An Alternative to 
Superfund Liability, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381 (1985). 
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see also Comment, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste 
Cleanup: An Examination ofCERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 643 (1985-
86). 
20. See Wickard Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc. 792 F.2d 887, 890-92 (9th Cir. 1986). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) provides: 
There shall be no liability under [§ 9607(a)] for a person otherwise liable who can establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance 
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God; 
(2) an act of war; 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the 
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual 
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole 
contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a 
common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence 
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking 
into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all rele-
vant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or 
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result 
from such acts or omissions; or 
( 4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs. 
22. All versions of the House and Senate bills made reference to strict and joint and several 
liability. The House introduced two bills which both died in the Senate: H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 23,568 (1980) and H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 
26,579 (1980). The Senate also introduced two bills: S. 1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. 
REc. 14,857 (1979), which died in subcommittee; and S.1480, S.1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 
CoNG. REc. 30,906 (1980) which after a few compromises became CERCLA. All of these bills 
made reference to strict and joint and several liability. For a comprehensive analysis of the various 
Senate and House Bills referring to joint and several liability under CERCLA, see Note, Joint 
and Several Liability Under Superfund: The Plight of the Small Volume Hazardous Waste Con-
tributor, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 1057 (1985). 
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term 'liable' or 'liability' under [CERCLA] shall be construed to be the 
standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of [Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, FWPCA]."23 As stated in United States 
v. Northeastern Pharmacy and Chemical Co. (NEPAC0),24 section 
1321 of FWCPA has been "consistently construed ... as a strict lia-
bility provision;"211 therefore, CERCLA "defendants can be held liable 
under a theory of strict liability."26 
B. joint and Several Liability 
Congress also left out any references to joint and several liability. 
Consequently, the judiciary has been left with the task of determining 
from the legislative history the scope of CERCLA liability. This task 
was to be particularly difficult because, as one court noted, "the legisla-
tive history is unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory 
statements. " 27 
In 1983, two federal district court cases, United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp. 28 and United States v. Wade (Wade I/),29 analyzed CER-
CLA's legislative history in an effort to discern Congress' intent regard-
ing the scope of liability under CERCLA. Each court concluded that 
references to joint and several liability were deleted from CERCLA "in 
order to have the scope of liability determined under common law prin-
ciples, where a court performing a case by case evaluation of the com-
plex factual scenarios associated with multiple-generator waste sites 
will assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an 
individual basis."30 
The Chem-Dyne and Wade II courts noted that applying joint and 
several liability on an individual basis was in accord with the legislative 
history. Senator Randolph (D-W. Va), sponsor of the amendment 
which deleted reference to joint and several liability from CERCLA, 
stated that Congress intended to retain strict liability, and references to 
joint and several liability were deleted because of "the difficulty in pre-
scribing in statutory terms liability standards which [would] be applica-
ble in individual cases."31 Senator Randolph further stated: 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988). 
24. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.O. Mo. 1984). 
25. /d. at 844. 
26. /d. 
27. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
28. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
29. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
30. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808; accord Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1338. 
31. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806 (quoting 126 CoNG. REc. S14969 (Nov. 24, 1980)); 
accord Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1337. 
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It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, 
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common 
law. An example is joint and several liability. Any reference to these 
terms has been deleted, and the liability of joint tortfeasors will be 
determined under common or previous statutory law. 32 
Representative Florio (D-N.J.), sponsor of the House Superfund bill, 
commented: 
Issues of joint and several liability not resolved by this [act] shall be 
governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. The 
terms joint and several have been deleted with the intent that the lia-
bility of joint tortfeasors be determined under common or previous 
statutory law .... To insure the development of a uniform rule of 
law, and to discourage business[es] dealing in hazardous substances 
from locating primarily in States with more lenient laws, the bill will 
encourage the further development of a Federal common law in this 
area. 33 
Thus, deleting the joint and several liability prov1s10ns of CERCLA 
was not meant to do away with the application of joint and several 
liability to CERCLA cases. The courts in Chem-Dyne and Wade II 
discounted Senator Helms' (R-S.C.) belief that any references to joint 
and several liability were deleted because they were "especially perni-
cious."34 The court in Chem-Dyne gave Senator Helms' opinion little 
weight because he was an opponent of the bill.36 The court in Wade II 
further explained that an entire reading of the record did not support 
Senator Helms' view but "reveal[ ed] that deletion of the reference to 
joint and several liability was intended to avoid mandating application 
of that standard to a situation where it would produce inequitable 
results. " 36 
Upon deciding that the scope of liability under CERCLA was to 
be determined by common law, the courts in Chem-Dyne and Wade II 
32. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 807 (quoting 126 CoNG. REc. 814964 (Nov. 24, 1980)); 
accord Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1337. 
33. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 801 (quoting 126 CoNG. REc. Hll787 (Dec. 3, 1980)). 
34. Senator Helms stated that retention of 
UJoint and several liability for costs and damages [would have been J especially perni-
cious . . . not only because of the exceedingly broad categories of persons subject to 
liability and the wide array of damages available, but also because it was coupled with 
an industry-based fund. Those contributing to the fund [would] frequently be paying 
for conditions, they had no responsibility in creating or even contributing to. To adopt a 
joint and several liability scheme on top of this would have been grossly unfair. 
Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806 (quoting 126 CoNG. REc. H 11787 (Dec. 3 1980)); accord Wade 
II, 577 F. Supp. at 1337. 
35. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806 (citations omitted). 
36. Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1337. 
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were faced with the question of whether state or federal common law 
should be applied. 37 After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 38 federal 
courts no longer had the power to fashion general common law. How-
ever, federal courts retained the power to make federal common law 
when "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests."39 The Chem-
Dyne and Wade II courts reasoned that "[b]ecause of the strong federal 
interest in the abatement of toxic waste sites and the need for a uniform 
liability standard ... Congress intended the development of a federal 
common law."40 
Once free to develop federal common law to govern the scope of 
CERCLA liability, the Chem-Dyne and Wade II courts tackled the 
joint and several liability issue. They adopted the Second Restatement 
of Torts rule, which classifies injuries as "distinct" or "non-distinct" 
with distinct harms being further classified as "divisible," or "indivisi-
ble," and placed the burden of proving divisibility upon the defend-
ant.41 Under the Restatement, joint and several liability .attaches only to 
harms which are non-distinct and indivisible.42 The problem, however, 
is that these courts gave little explanation of how a responsible party 
could prove divisibility of injury. 
IV. PROVING DIVISIBILITY OF INJURY 
At least three possible approaches to proving divisibility of injury 
in CERCLA cases have been proffered. First, there are the Gore 
amendments of H.R. 7020, which allowed courts to apportion the 
harm, even if a defendant could not prove divisibility of injury; how-
ever, the amendments were correctly deleted from the final act because 
they added nothing to the common law. Second, there are the common 
law principles, articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
37. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808; see also Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1338. 
38. 304 U.S. 64 (I 938). 
39. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (I 964)). 
40. Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1338; see Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808-09. 
41. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810; Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1338-39. Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts notes that some injuries, "by their very nature, are obviously incapable of any 
reasonable or practical division." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS 347 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON). Death or a 
single wound are the clearest examples of indivisible injuries. See id. On the other hand, other 
injuries, "by their nature, are more capable of apportionment." Id. at 348. The above commentary 
gives the example of a plaintiff being shot in the leg and in the arm by two defendants as an 
injury that is capable of apportionment. See id. However, other scholars take issue with the com-
mentary's two-wound example of a harm capable of apportionment. See infra text accompanying 
notes 108-10. 
42. See infra text accompanying note 76. 
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are the current approach of proving divisibility of injury in CERCLA 
cases; however, as a practical matter such apportionment at this stage is 
unavailable. Third, there is the economic efficiency theory advocated by 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz, which demonstrates that the Second 
Restatement approach to divisibility of injury is economically inefficient 
and that the harms from joint polluters are not divisible. 
A. The Gore Amendments 
Although the Gore amendments, along with the rest of H.R. 7020, 
were rejected, some courts grappling with the difficult question of divis-
ibility have cited them favorably." 3 However, courts which cite the 
Gore amendments with approval do so erroneously."" 
The Gore amendments constituted the most direct and comprehen-
sive description of divisibility of harm in CERCLA's legislative his-
tory."'~ The amendments were aimed at the provisions of H.R. 7020, as 
reported, which completely eviscerated the joint and several liability 
provisions of that bill. 46 These early provisions required the court to 
apportion damages among the defendants, even if the defendants could 
not establish a basis for apportionment. 47 On the other hand, the Gore 
43. See, e.g., United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
44. At least one court has completely misunderstood the Gore amendments and their role in 
establishing divisibility of injury. In United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 
938 (W.D. Wash. 1990), the district court stated that the Gore Amendments were not to be used 
in establishing divisibility, but rather, that they were to be used in contribution. Such application 
of the Gore amendments is not in accord with their original purpose. The Gore amendments were 
to be used at the discretion of the federal district court in apportioning damages at the divisibility 
stage. See STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LI-
ABILITY AcT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) 296-302 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter 2 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]. 
45. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 44, at 439-40. 
46. See STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. AND PuBuc WoRKS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY oF THE CoMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REsPoNsE, CoMPENSATION AND LI-
ABILITY AcT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) 300-02 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter 3 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]. 
47. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 44, at 184-85. H.R. 7020, as reported, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
[A]ny person who caused or contributed to the release or threatened release shall be 
strictly liable for such costs. Except as provided in paragraph (2), such liability shall be 
joint and several with any other person who caused or contributed to such release. 
(2)(A) If a generator or transporter of hazardous waste establishes that only a 
portion of the total costs described in subsection (b) are attributable to hazardous waste 
generated or transported by him, such generator or transporter shall be liable under 
this subsection only for such portion. If the owner or operator of any inactive hazardous 
waste site establishes that only a portion of the total costs described in subsection (b) 
are attributable to hazardous waste which was treated, stored or disposed of in a period 
during which he owned or operated the site, such owner or operator shall be liable 
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amendments did not require the court to apportion the harm beyond 
what was allowed by the common law; instead, the amendments pro-
vided equitable factors which the court could consider if, in its discre-
tion, it determined the harm was further apportionable.48 
Notwithstanding the fact that Representative Gore sponsored the 
amendments to H.R. 7020, he preferred the common law approach 
which placed the burden of proof on the defendants to establish divisi-
bility of injury in order to avoid the imposition of joint and several 
liability.49 He offered the amendments only because he was so strongly 
opposed to H.R. 7020, as reported, which required courts to apportion 
the harm in CERCLA cases.'10 Representative Gore stated the 
following: 
[The portion of the statute requmng courts to apportion damages] 
should be removed from the liability provision to allow a court to 
proceed under a true joint and several liability scheme. I reluctantly 
relaxed my efforts to completely delete this misguided subsection and 
in a spirit of compromise, I am instead offering an amendment to 
help ease its adverse effects. 
My proposal would affirm the court's authority to apportion the 
remaining costs under [the common law approach], but would not re-
quire such apportionment. The language would permit the court to 
apportion the remaining damages among the remaining defendants, 
taking into account certain equitable factors. Apportionment would be 
solely at the discretion of the court.&1 
Moreover, Representative Gore recognized that the "trick," where mul-
tiple tortfeasors are involved, "is to determine when an injury can in 
fact be considered indivisible and thereby permit employment of joint 
and several liability."112 Representative Gore further recognized that 
there are two sorts of indivisibility-theoretical and practical. Strik-
ingly, he classified pollution by multiple defendants as usually being 
under this section only for such portion. 
(B) To the extent apportionment is not established under subparagraph (A), the 
court shall apportion the liability, to the maximum extent practicable, among the par-
ties based upon evidence presented by the parties as to their contributions. 
(C) Following any apportionment under this paragraph, no person shall be re-
quired to pay in excess of his apportioned share of the total costs described in subsec-
tion (b). 
/d. (emphasis added). 
48. See infra text accompanying note 55. 
49. 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 46, at 296-302. 
50. /d. 
51. /d. at 302 (emphasis added). 
52. Id. at 297. 
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practically indivisible. 118 He classified injuries, such as death and total 
destruction of one's real or personal property, as theoretically 
indivisible. 114 
The equitable factors articulated by Representative Gore and in-
cluded in the House-passed version of H.R. 7020 were to be applied as 
follows: 
(B) To the extent apportionment is not established under the 
[common law approach of] subparagraph (A) the court may apportion 
the liability among the parties where deemed appropriate based upon 
evidence presented by the parties as to their contribution. In appor-
tioning liability under this subparagraph, the court may consider 
among other factors, the following: 
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their 
contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal of a hazard-
ous waste can be distinguished; 
(ii) the amount of hazardous waste involved; 
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste 
involved; 
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the gen-
eration, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the 
hazardous waste; 
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with re-
spect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account 
the characteristics of such hazardous waste; 
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Fed-
eral, State, or local officials to prevent any harm to the pub-
lic health or the environment. 1111 
The Gore amendments would have provided a method of appor-
tioning harm in CERCLA cases based on equitable factors; however, 
they added nothing to the common law. The common law allows a 
party to prove divisibility of injury, and if it is unsuccessful, then the 
harm can be apportioned in an action for contribution.116 The first three 
Gore factors simply state what a party must show to establish divisibil-
ity of harm under the common law-the amount and degree of toxicity 
of the hazardous substance and the ability to discretely show their con-
tribution to the harm. The last three factors can be considered by a 
court of equity in an action for contribution. Moreover, allowing the 
courts to apply the federal common law is what Representative Gore 
preferred. His amendments were simply offered in a spirit of compro-
53. /d. at 297-98. 
54. Id. 
55. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 44, at 439-40. 
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 433A (1964) and 886A (1977). 
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mise, and should be understood in accordance with his support of com-
mon law principles. However, as explained in the following section, the 
common law approach of proving divisibility of harm is impracticable. 
B. The Common Law Approach of The Restatement (Second) ofTorts 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for joint and several 
liability of multiple tortfeasors when there is an indivisible harm.67 If 
the harm is divisible, only several liability will be applied.68 However, 
where joint polluters are involved, the harm will almost never be 
divisible. 
1. Traditional application of the common law to multiple polluters 
Traditionally, the rule in all multiple defendant cases has been 
that a defendant is responsible only for damages he proximately causes, 
and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving damages. Moreover, joint 
and several liability arose only when there was joint action or each 
defendant owed a common duty to the plaintiff.li9 For example, in 
Johnson v. City of Fairmont,60 a nuisance case, the independent acts of 
two defendants combined to pollute a stream and produced "offensive 
odors" on the plaintiffs premises.61 The court held that "acts of inde-
pendent tortfeasors, each of which cause some damage, may not be con-
sidered to create a joint liability at law for damages."62 
Over the years, however, courts began to hold each defendant lia-
ble for the total harm caused.63 In Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Divi-
sion, National Steel Corporation,6" thirty-seven Canadian citizens filed 
a nuisance action against three corporations which operated plants in 
the United States.66 The plaintiffs individually claimed damages rang-
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977). 
58. See id. at §§ 433A, 881. 
59. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 41, at 346-52. 
60. 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572 (1933). 
61. /d. at 452, 247 N.W. at 573. 
62. /d. 
63. W. PROSSER, j. WADE & U. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 385 (8th 
ed. 1988). Prosser identifies two different legal means to hold each defendant liable: "(a) to find 
the injury was indivisible and therefore not apportionable as a matter of substantive law, and (b) 
to hold that the burden of proof is upon the defendants to show factual basis for apportionment 
with the result that apportionment is unavailable as a practical matter." /d.; see, e.g., Landers v. 
East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (!952) (as a matter of law, 
defendants are jointly and severally liable for harm caused by pollution where harm is not reason-
ably apportionable); Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961) (burden of 
proof is on defendant where harm is indivisible). 
64. 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974). 
65. /d. at 215. 
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ing from $11 ,000 to $35,000 from all three companies jointly and sev-
erally.66 On interlocutory appeal, defendants moved to dismiss the case, 
alleging that each plaintiff had individually failed to meet the $10,000 
amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction.67 The Sixth Circuit be-
lieved the issue to be whether, under Michigan law, multiple defend-
ants could be held jointly and severally liable.68 The court stated that 
if there is competent testimony, adduced either by plaintiff or defend-
ant, that the injuries are factually and medically separable, and that 
the liability for all such injuries and damages, or parts thereof, may 
be allocated with reasonable certainty to the impacts in turn, the jury 
will be directed accordingly and mere difficulty in doing so will not 
relieve the trier of the facts of this responsibility. This merely follows 
the general rule that "where independent concurring acts have caused 
distinct and separate injuries to the plaintiff, or where some reasona-
ble means of apportioning the damages is evident, the courts generally 
will not hold the tort-feasors jointly and severally liable." 
. . . "Where the negligence of two or more persons concur in 
producing a single indivisible injury, then such persons are jointly and 
severally liable, although there was no common duty, common design, 
or concert action.''89 
Although the court did not decide whether the defendants were to 
be held jointly and severally liable, it did hold that each plaintiff, who 
had alleged damages of $10,000 or more against the three defendants 
jointly and severally, had satisfied the amount in controversy require-
ment for diversity jurisdiction and that each defendant could be held 
liable for the $11 ,000. 70 The court also held that putting the burden on 
the plaintiff to prove which defendant "was responsible and to what 
degree" was unjust.71 
Michie illustrates the trend away from holding a defendant only 
responsible for the damages which he proximately caused. Further-
more, the case illustrates that a defendant in a multiple defendant pol-
lution case is likely to be held jointly and severally liable for the entire 
amount of the damage. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. at 214. Currently, the case in controversy amount is $50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(1988). 
68. 495 F.2d at 215. 
69. /d. at 216-17 (quoting Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 432-33, 108 N.W.2d 33, 
36 (1961)). 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
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2. Restatement (Second) of Torts 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts classifies harms as "distinct" 
or "non-distinct."72 Distinct harms are "by their nature more capable 
of apportionment" than non-distinct harms.78 Non-distinct harms are 
further classified as either "divisible" or "indivisible." Divisible harms, 
"while not so clearly marked out as severable into distinct parts, are 
still capable of division upon a reasonable and rationale basis and of 
fair apportionment among the causes responsible."74 Indivisible harms 
are those which are "incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical 
division."711 Under the Second Restatement, joint and several liability 
attaches only to harms which are indivisible.76 
Interestingly, the Second Restatement describes stream pollution as 
a divisible harm. Comment d of section 443A states: 
[A]pportionment is commonly made in cases of private nuisance, 
where the pollution of a stream, or flooding, or smoke or dust or 
noise, from different sources, has interfered with the plaintifPs use or 
enjoyment of his land. Thus where two or more factories indepen-
dently pollute a stream, the interference with the plaintifPs water 
may be treated as divisible in terms of degree, and may be appor-
tioned among the owners of the factories, on the basis of evidence of 
the respective quantities of pollution discharged into the stream.77 
This example of apportionment in a nuisance case is a carry-over 
from the First Restatement. Under the First Restatement all nuisance 
actions were apportioned, regardless of the "indivisibility" of the in-
jury.78 However, as seen in Michie, courts are no longer so willing to 
apportion damages in nuisance pollution cases.79 Moreover, the harm 
in this example is not divisible at all-the interference with plaintiffs 
water use is one indivisible injury. As one author pointed out, "[t]he 
apportionment occurs in the causation. It is easier to tell how much 
each defendant contributed to the cause of the harm . . . than to the 
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1977). 
73. /d. at comment b. The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives, as an example of distinct 
harms, the following situation: 
/d. 
If two defendants independently shoot the plaintiff at the same time, and one wounds 
him in the arm and the other in the leg, the ultimate result may be a badly damaged 
plaintiff in the hospital, but it is still possible, as a practical matter, to regard the two 
wounds as separate injuries, and as distinct wrongs. 
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment d (1977). 
75. /d. at comment i. 
76. See id. at §§ 875, 881. 
77. Id. at § 443A comment d (emphasis added). 
78. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 881 (1934). 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71. 
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harm itsel£."80 Although causation can be practically apportioned, the 
harm itself is neither theoretically nor practically divisible. 
3. Application of the Restatement (Second) to CERCLA cases 
As mentioned earlier, Chem-Dyne and Wade II propounded the 
Second Restatement as the appropriate standard for determining the 
scope of liability under CERCLA.81 In United States v. Monsanto 
Co. ,82 the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the Second Restatement as the 
"correct and uniform federal rules applicable to CERCLA cases."83 
Therefore, in order to apply the Second Restatement's principles, a 
"court's initial focus should be on whether the harm at the . . . site 
was indivisible."8 ' However, a defendant may not prove divisibility of 
injury by arbitrary or theoretical means.86 
A defendant desiring to prove divisibility should concentrate on his 
contribution to the harm and more importantly on the nexus between 
that contribution and the harm itsel£.86 Although proof of "respective 
quantities dumped" is sufficient under the Second Restatement exam-
ple, such proof has proven insufficient in CERCLA cases. In United 
States v. Ottati & Gross, Inc., 87 defendants Lily, General Electric, and 
Lewis Chemical proved the approximate number of drums of waste 
they dumped at the cleanup site.88 Nevertheless, because the chemicals 
had mixed together contaminating the ground and surface water, the 
harm was considered indivisible and the defendants were held jointly 
and severally liable.89 Thus, where chemicals have mixed, merely es-
tablishing the "respective quantities dumped" is insufficient to prove 
divisibility of injury in CERCLA cases. 
In Monsanto, the Fourth Circuit described what a defendant must 
prove to show the nexus between his contribution and the harm at the 
80. Prager, Apportioning Liability for Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L. 
198, 203 (1986-87). 
81. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
82. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). 
83. /d. at 172. 
84. United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C. 
1984). 
85. See Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp 1439, 1448-49 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
"[A]rbitrary or theoretical means of cost apportionment ... are matters appropriately considered 
in an action of contribution between responsible parties after plaintiff has been made whole." /d. 
(quoting South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, 653 F. Supp. at 995). 
86. See Prager, supra note 77, at 203-04. 
87. 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985). 
88. /d. at 1396. Lily shipped approximately 670 drums of waste; General Electric shipped 
approximately 458 drums of waste; and Lewis Chemical shipped between 732 and 900 drums of 
waste. /d. 
89. /d. 
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site. The Fourth Circuit stated that a defendant must 
(show] a relationship between waste volume, the release of hazardous 
substances, and the harm at the site. Further, in light of the commin-
gling of hazardous substances, the district court [can]not ... reasona-
bly [apportion] liability without some evidence disclosing the individ-
ual and interactive qualities of the substances deposited there. 
Common sense counsels that a million gallons of certain substances 
would be mixed together without significant consequences, whereas a 
few pints of others improperly mixed could result in disastrous 
consequences. 90 
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The Fourth Circuit also noted that "evidence disclosing the relative 
toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic capacity of the hazardous 
substances at the site would be relevant to establishing divisibility of 
harm."91 
The elements that a defendant must show to prove divisibility, 
when taken collectively, almost require the defendant to "fingerprint" 
his wastes, something the government is not even required to do when 
proving causation.92 The difficulty in proving divisibility of injury 
presents defendants with a near unsurmountable task. As Prosser 
noted, "(when] the burden of proof is upon the defendants to show fac-
tual basis for apportionment; . . . apportionment is unavailable as a 
practical matter."98 Thus, it is not surprising that no section 9607 
CERCLA case has found the injury divisible. 
C. The Economic Efficiency Method 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz take an economic approach to 
divisibility of injury and apportionment of harm.94 Their analysis is 
based on a theoretical model in which multiple parties contribute to a 
landfill site. The damage from a release is considered to be the cost of 
cleaning up the landfill and the surrounding affected areas!5 The ex-
pected damage from a release at the site is considered a loss to society, 
unless there is a legal provision shifting the liability to the dumpers.96 
90. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) (footnotes omitted). 
91. /d. at n.26. 
92. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
93. W. PROSSER, supra note 63, at 385. See generally O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 
(1st Cir. 1989); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172; United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. 
Supp. 930, 936 (W.D. Wash. 1985); United States v. Ottati & Gross, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 
1396 (D.N.H. 1985) (evidence insufficient to prove divisibility of injury). 
94. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 3. 
95. Id. at 835. 
96. /d. at 835. In the absence of a legal provision, the loss falls on those who suffer from the 
contaminated site and on the federal government who is responsible for the cleanup. /d. at 836 & 
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The goal of the model is to allow a socially efficient amount of waste to 
be dumped at a site.97 An efficient, or socially optimal, amount of waste 
would equal "the sum of the benefits derived by the actors minus the 
social loss."98 The problem, as identified by the model, is that the eco-
nomically rational dumper does not make her decision based on what is 
a socially efficient amount to dump, rather she makes her decision 
based on "the benefit that she derives ... minus whatever share of the 
social loss the legal regime allocates to her."99 
This comment agrees with Professors Kornhauser and Revesz's 
contention that proving divisibility of injury (stage one apportionment) 
in CERCLA cases is an impractical objective and that joint and several 
liability should attach. Professors Kornhauser and Revesz, however, 
discuss the issue of divisibility of injury in the context of actions based 
on negligence where "the characterization of the harm is important be-
cause it determines whether the negligent actors must pay for the dam-
age attributable to non-negligent actors. " 100 Nevertheless, their analysis 
of distinct and non-distinct harms illustrates the impracticability of es-
tablishing divisibility of injury under the traditional common law 
rules.101 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz also suggest that, under the 
traditional rules of apportionment, economic efficiency calls for the ap-
plication of negligence rather than strict liability to CERCLA.102 How-
ever, rather than suggesting that the standard of liability in CERCLA 
be changed to negligence, they propose a method of apportionment that 
would produce an efficient outcome under strict liability.103 They sug-
gest an apportionment scheme "which attach[ es] significance to whether 
an actor is taking the socially optimal amount of care."104 Their ap-
proach, however, is flawed because it requires the courts to determine 
the socially optimal amount of waste for a dumper to dump. A task 
that, in light of the complexities of hazardous wastes, is too onerous for 
n.22. 
97. See id. at 837. 
98. /d. 
99. /d. Professors Kornhauser and Revesz state that the social loss born by each dumper is 
dependant on two factors: (1) the liability rule and (2) the apportionment rule. /d. at 836. They 
consider the liability rules of negligence and strict liability. Their analysis of apportionment rules 
considers how "joint tortfeasors divide the loss among themselves" and what portion of the loss the 
victim must bear. /d. at 836-37. Punitive damages were not considered as they are generally based 
on intentional wrongdoing. /d. at 833. 
100. /d. at 858; see also id. at 841, 851-56. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 105-16. 
102. Kornhouser & Revesz, supra note 3, at 833. 
103. See id. at 833, 858-60. 
104. /d. at 833. 
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the courts to bear. This section of the comment will discuss Professors 
Kornhauser and Revesz's approach to divisibility and apportionment of 
harm and will conclude with a criticism of their approach to 
apportionment. 
1. Divisibility of injury 
For purposes of efficiency, Professors Kornhauser and Revesz 
redefine the Second Restatement categories of harm (i.e., distinct, non-
distinct but divisible, and non-distinct and indivisible).1011 They classify 
harms as either distinct (divisible) or non-distinct (indivisible), with 
joint and several liability only attaching to non-distinct harms. 106 A dis-
tinct harm occurs when "the damage caused by one actor is indepen-
dent of the harm caused by the other actors."107 A non-distinct injury 
would occur "where the damage caused by one actor increases the dam-
age caused by the other."108 Professors Kornhauser and Revesz do 
away with the Second Restatement's distinction between non-distinct 
but divisible and non-distinct and indivisible harms since division of the 
injury in CERCLA cases is practically impossible. 109 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz's definition of a distinct injury 
is similar to the Second Restatement approach. In fact, in support of 
their definition of distinct harms, they cite the Second Restatement: 
If two defendants independently shoot the plaintiff at the same time, 
and one wounds him in the arm and the other in the leg, the ultimate 
result may be a badly damaged plaintiff in the hospital, but it is still 
possible, as a logical, reasonable, and practical matter, to regard the 
two wounds as separate injuries, and as distinct wrongs. The mere 
coincidence in time does not make the two wounds a single harm, or 
the conduct of the two defendants one tort. 110 
I 05. Professors Kornhauser and Revesz note that 
in defining the three categories, the Restatement contemplates that a harm can be ap-
portionable in four different senses. A distinct harm is one that is "more" capable of 
apportionment; a non-distinct but divisible harm is one that is somewhat less capable of 
apportionment; and a non-distinct and indivisible harm is presumably even less capable 
of apportionment. But even if a harm is non-distinct and indivisible, the defendant held 
jointly and severally liable may have a right of contribution, with the amount of such 
contribution determined by reference to the "equitable shares" of each of the defend-
ants. This division is, then, another way of apportioning the damage. Not surprisingly, 
great confusion surrounds the question of when the tortfeasors should be held jointly 
and severally liable. 
/d. at 852. 
106. /d. 
107. /d. 
108. /d. 
109. See id. at 852-55. 
110. /d. at 853-54 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 433A comment b 
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However, they disagree with the Second Restatement's conclusion that 
a rough estimate can be made "which will fairly apportion" the pain 
and suffering, or medical expenses, from the two wounds. 111 They cor-
rectly point out that if the presence of one wound increased the pain 
and suffering of the other, the harm to the victim would be non-distinct 
and joint and several liability would attach. 112 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz also take issue with the Second 
Restatement's example of divisible harms. The Second Restatement 
provides that "where two or more factories independently pollute a 
stream, the interference with the plaintiffs use of water may be appor-
tioned among the owners of the factories, on the basis of evidence of the 
respective quantities of pollution discharged into the stream."113 They 
explain that it is improbable that damages in the case of joint polluters 
would display a linear relationship. As an example, they note that "as 
the concentration of dissolved oxygen in water decreases toward a 
threshold, there will be a pronounced increase in the damage caused, 
since the water will no longer be able to support fish." 114 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz appropriately conclude that 
where one polluter's discharge affects the harm caused by another, the 
injuries are non-distinct, and joint and several liability should be im-
posed.1111 In support of their definitions and in their criticism of the 
Second Restatement, they state: 
From an efficiency perspective, there is no need to have three differ-
ent categories of harms, since there are only two possible legal conse-
quences: imposition or rejection of joint and several liability. Because 
there is no legal significance to the distinction between distinct harms 
on the one hand and non-distinct on the other, ... it is [not] helpful 
to separate harms along these lines. To the contrary, the multiplicity 
of unnecessary legal categories is quite likely to breed confusion.116 
2. Apportionment of harm 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz contend that "(a]lthough rules 
of joint and several liability are efficient under negligence, they will not 
produce efficient results under strict liability."117 The inefficiency 
(1977)). 
11 I. Id. 
112. /d. 
113. /d. at 854 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment d (1977)). 
114. /d. at 855. 
115. /d. 
116. /d. at 853. 
117. /d. at 858. 
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results 
because an actor who contemplates dumping more than the socially 
optimal level does not bear the full increase in the damage that she 
imposes on society. In the case of existing apportionment rules under 
strict liability, other actors must themselves bear a portion of the in-
crease in damage caused by the actor who dumps more than the social 
optimum.118 
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Professors Kornhauser and Revesz thus contend that the imposition of 
joint and several liability and the resulting contribution actions (where 
liability is apportioned in proportion to, among other things, the 
amount and toxicity of waste dumped)119 is an inefficient outcome. 120 
Instead, they propose a simple rule for apportionment under CERCLA 
and explain why it is efficient: 
[T]he full damage is [to be] divided per capita among the various ac-
tors when none dump more than the socially optimal level. If some 
actors dump more than this level, then those actors divide the full 
damage among themselves per capita, and the remaining actors pay 
nothing. 
Such a rule is efficient. If all but one of the actors meet the so-
cially optimal level, it would not be rational for the remaining actor to 
dump more than the socially optimal amount. If she were to increase 
her output beyond the social optimum, she would bear the full in-
crease in the ensuing damage. In addition, she would have to pay the 
full damage that occurs when all the actors meet the socially optimal 
level, rather than the per capita share of that damage, which she 
would pay if she did not depart from this level. 121 
3. Criticism of apportionment scheme 
The problem with Professors Kornhauser and Revesz's approach 
is that apportioning the loss depends on whether the actors meet the 
amorphous "socially optimal" level to dump and whether courts would 
be required to determine the social optimum.122 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz indicate that one of the reasons 
that a court may make mistakes in determining the socially optimal 
118. /d. 
119. See id. at 843 & n.54 (citing Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1487-88 
(D. Colo. 1985). 
120. /d. at 857. 
121. /d. at 858-59. 
122. It is true that courts routinely have to determine the social optimum in order to deter-
mine the standard of care in negligence cases. However, perhaps the reason that Congress pre-
ferred a strict liability standard is because of the impossibility of determining the social optimum 
where hazardous wastes are involved. 
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amount to dump is because of the difficulty in ascertaining the exact 
benefits dumpers receive from engaging in businesses that generate 
wastes.128 However, economic benefit to the dumpers is only one factor 
which determines the socially optimum amount to dump. The other 
factor is the social loss. The social loss is the full amount of the damage 
resulting from a release. Determining the social loss will be more diffi-
cult than determining the economic benefit to the dumpers. However, 
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz make no mention of this problem or 
how to resolve it. 
A determination of the social loss is too onerous for the courts. In 
determining the social loss attributable to a particular site, the court 
will have to decide the optimum level of dumping for each site. That 
inquiry includes the characteristics of the site (e.g., the proximity of the 
site to ground water or residential areas), the relative toxicity, and the 
migratory and interactive properties of the wastes to be dumped at the 
site by each individual dumper. This would require the court to delve 
into a detailed, fact-finding mission. The court would essentially need 
to determine what the future cost of CERCLA remedial action of the 
site would be. In other words, the court must determine, prior to a 
release, what the damages of the release would be in order to establish 
the socially optimum amount to dump. It is unlikely that courts will 
choose to undertake this burden. Professors Kornhauser and Revesz 
predicted the fate of their own apportionment scheme when they ac-
knowledged that if the costs of determining the socially optimal level to 
dump are too great, "or if courts are unable to determine the social 
optimum, traditional strict liability rules might be preferred over . 
efficient strict liability rules. " 124 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
The practical impossibility of proving divisibility under the Re-
statement, plus the confusion which arrives from its classification of 
harms (distinct, non-distinct but divisible, and non-distinct and indivisi-
ble) argues against its application in CERCLA cases. The economically 
efficient definition of distinct versus non-distinct injury is the clearest 
and most practical approach. This definition provides that whenever 
the damage caused by one actor increases the damage caused by the 
other, joint and several liability should attach. Therefore, injuries re-
sulting from releases of hazardous waste disposal sites should be classi-
fied as non-distinct (non-distinct and indivisible), and joint and several 
123. Kornhauser and Revesz, supra note 3, at 862. 
124. /d. at 860 (footnote omitted). 
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liability should attach. 
Apportionment of harm in CERCLA cases, should, and for all 
practical purposes does, take place in contribution actions. 1211 Further, 
the harm should continue to be apportioned among the defendants in 
proportion to the amount of harm which they cause. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
This comment has discussed the scope of liability under CERCLA 
and three possible methods of proving divisibility of harm. Congress 
intentionally deleted all references to both strict and joint and several 
liability. 126 Congress did this so that liability under CERCLA could be 
imposed under traditional and evolving principles of federal common 
law. 127 Federal courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
as the appropriate standard to be applied in CERCLA cases. Under 
the Second Restatement, harms are divided generally into distinct and 
non-distinct harms with joint and several liability only attaching to 
non-distinct harms. 128 A CERCLA defendant wishing to prove divisi-
bility of harm should concentrate on his contribution to the harm and 
on the nexus between that contribution and the harm itsel£. 129 How-
ever, as a practical matter, when the burden of proof is upon the de-
fendants, divisibility of harm is unavailable. Had the Gore Amend-
ments been adopted, courts, at their discretion, could have used specific 
equitable factors to apportion the harm. The most restrictive view of 
divisibility of harm is that taken by Professors Kornhauser and 
Revesz. 130 They would define any injury as non-distinct "where the 
damage caused by one actor increases the damage caused by the 
other."131 In the case of joint polluters, this would almost always be the 
case. 
Neither the Restatement nor the economic efficiency model give 
much hope of proving divisibility of injury in CERCLA cases. The 
Gore amendments came the closest to providing defendants with . a 
means of apportioning liability other than by contribution. However, 
the Gore amendments were rejected and cannot be relied upon. 
In summary, proving divisibility of injury in CERCLA cases is 
impracticable and inefficient. Harm caused from releases at hazardous 
125. For an analysis of contribution in CERCLA cases, see Comment, Contribution Under 
CERCLA: judicial Treatment After SARA, 14 CoLUM. J. ENV'T. L. 267 (1989). 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36. 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80. 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 81-93. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 105-16. 
131. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 3, at 853. 
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waste sites should be considered non-distinct, and joint and several lia-
bility should attach. Apportionment of harm should come in contribu-
tion actions. The method of apportionment advanced by Professors 
Kornhauser and Revesz is impractical and should not be adopted. The 
current method of apportioning harm, according to the proportion of 
one's contribution, is the preferred method. 
Bruce C. Jenkins 
